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CAPITAL GUIDELINES AND ETHICAL DUTIES:
MUTUALLY REINFORCING RESPONSIBILITIES
Lawrence J. Fox*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the adoption by the
American Bar Association of the first code of professional conduct in
1908.1 Now a century later, the American Bar Association can be
justifiably proud of the fact that the current iteration of the rules is in the
process of being adopted in virtually every jurisdiction, albeit with each

jurisdiction sometimes insisting on quirky variations on the basic
themes.2 But that aside, the current Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct
have basically occupied the field and, as a result, lawyers take it as a
given that their conduct is to be measured against the standards
established in those rules and that failure to meet those standards can not
only result in discipline, but also result in a claim for malpractice, fee
forfeiture, sanctions, or other unfortunate results. Yet as harsh as any of
those results might be, there is never a suggestion that the standards
established by those rules are mere goals. Rather, there is universal
recognition that the rules establish measurable levels of performance that

*

Partner and former Managing Partner at Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP in Philadelphia, the

I. Grant Irey, Jr. Adjunct Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Lecturer on
Law at the Harvard Law School. As Chair of the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project, Mr.
Fox moved the adoption of the Guidelines by the House of Delegates. He has served as a member
and Chair of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and was a member of the American Bar Association Ethics 2000 project, which
rewrote the Model Rules. Mr. Fox is the author of Legal Tender and, with Susan Martyn, has
written a case book, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2008) and THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: NATIONAL RULES,
STANDARDS, STATUTES, AND STATE LAWYER CODES (4th ed. 2008). Mr. Fox and Professor Martyn
also wrote RED FLAGS: LEGAL ETHICS FOR LAWYERS and YOUR LAWYER, AUSER'S GUIDE (2006).
1. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
2. See S. MARTYN, L. Fox & W.B. WENDEL, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 109-23
(Walters Kluwer 2008) (illustrating state variations on confidentiality and conflicts of interest).
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lawyers in fact are expected to achieve, day in and day out, for clients
large and small, criminal and civil, on Wall Street and on Main Street.
Given that background, it is extremely instructive to review the
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ("ABA Guidelines"), and related
commentary and scholarship, now including the valuable Supplementary
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases ("Supplementary Guidelines"), through the prism of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In fact, as the author has
considered this topic, he has found it presents a quite remarkable twoway street. One way, the ABA Guidelines can be seen as simply the very
specific implementation of the ethical rules. As the rules apply to a
lawyer handling a slip and fall case in Paducah, Kentucky, they ought
also to apply to a lawyer defending an accused of a capital crime in
Houston, Texas. The other way, the ABA Guidelines can be seen as
providing a wonderful example of how some of the more general but,
notwithstanding their generality, no less important rules of professional
conduct should be evaluated in particular contexts.
Indeed, in this author's opinion, the core principles expressed in the
ABA Guidelines, commentary, and Supplementary Guidelines are no
more than detailed, contextualized explanations of counsel's existing
obligations under the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. In providing
useful guidance to both the lawyer and nonlawyer members of capital
defense teams, the Supplementary Guidelines describe counsel's
comprehensive duty to "giv[e] reasonable assurance that [the conduct of
nonlawyer members of the lawyer's team] is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer.",3 This Article will address how
the Supplementary Guidelines permit all members of the defense team to
recognize, understand, and abide by counsel's duty to provide effective
representation to the client, fulfilling all professional responsibilities.
II.

THE DUTY OF COMPETENCE

This analysis starts with Model Rule 1.1, which rarely raises the
kind of real controversy seen in areas such as confidentiality and
conflicts of interest, and is among the shortest in terms of its number of
words. Rule 1.1 simply provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for

3.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 5.3(a) (2007).
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the representation." 4 The ABA Guidelines reflect not only the
importance of this rule but also the multiple complicated factors that
must be met to achieve compliance with it. The ABA Guidelines set
forth a thorough commentary of the critical factors one would need to
evaluate to determine competence in the area of capital defense. In a
way that is useful to all members of the capital defense team, the
Supplementary Guidelines describe in further detail the functions that
are important to competent representation.
The ABA Guidelines direct attention to the size of the legal team
that is required for this cardiac surgery of legal representations. While
the ABA Guidelines establish a minimum of two lawyers (a rather
modest number given how often the most garden variety civil
depositions are staffed with two lawyers), the ABA Guidelines make it
clear that the team, in fact, has to be much larger than that. This brings
us to yet another dimension of the competence question, which is the
requirement that the team not only include legal talent, but also
significant high quality personnel in other areas of endeavor.
In recognizing the need for personnel whose expertise is in different
areas of endeavor, the ABA Guidelines are simply extrapolating from an
important comment to Rule 1.1. That comment provides that it is
perfectly permissible for a lawyer who wants to achieve competence in
an area with which he or she is unfamiliar to associate with "a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question." 5 While the comment
does not specifically provide for the lawyer to associate with nonlawyers
in fields of inquiry in which the lawyer lacks competence, in fact the
standard of care for lawyers in any matter that recognizes significant
nonlegal expertise is to consult with experts in those subject matter
areas. Examples abound. Lawyers handling medical malpractice cases
will associate with physicians, pharmacologists, and psychiatrists.
Lawyers in product failure cases will associate with engineers,
metallurgists, and physicists.
The ABA Guidelines identify two specific areas as to which it is
critical for the lawyer to associate with others: someone thoroughly
familiar with mental or psychological disorders and a mitigation
specialist who has expertise in assembling the necessary data about the
background of the accused that could be used to dissuade the decision-

4. Id.at R. 1.1.
5. Id.
atR. 1.l,cmt. 2.
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maker from seeking or imposing the death penalty if the jury finds the
defendant to have committed a capital crime.6
A.

Feesfor an Adequate Defense

Given the fact that the prosecution in capital cases will likely be
represented by well-funded and skilled specialists, 7 issues of fees and
workload have become central to the defense team's duty of competent
performance imposed by Rule 1.1. Compensation in indigent defense is
an issue that courts have grappled with for generations. Fifty years ago,
Justice Black wrote: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' In advocating
for adequate fees and expenses to enable capital defense teams to
perform effectively, and in acknowledging counsel's duty to seek
adequate defense funding, 9 the Supplementary Guidelines find firm roots
in the ABA Guidelines, in current constitutional doctrine, and the rules
of professional conduct. In providing that nonlawyer members of the
defense team be "fully compensated at a rate that is commensurate with
the provision of high quality legal representation and reflects the
specialized skills needed to assist counsel with the litigation of death
penalty cases," Supplementary Guideline 9.1 echoes the requirement of
ABA Guideline 9. 1(C). 10

6. See SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS

IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 5.1, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES]. In order to be competent the defense team must also include a
traditional fact investigator as well as all of the various technical experts-experts in ballistics,
DNA analysis, handwriting, and other forensic fields-that the particular facts of the given case will
require. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985) (where an indigent defendant's
sanity is at issue in the case, a competent psychiatrist must be provided to aid in the defense).
7. See ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
INDEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 9.1, commentary (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913
(2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES] (noting array of formal and informal resources available to
prosecution).
The
ABA
GUIDELINES
are
also
available
online
at
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf.
8. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
9. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 9.1; SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES,
supranote 6, at Guideline 4.1(A), 9.1.
10. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 9.1; ABA GUIDELINES, supra
note 7, at Guideline 9.1(C) ("Non-attomey members of the defense team should be fully
compensated at a rate that is commensurate with the provision of high quality legal representation
and reflects the specialized skills needed by those who assist counsel with the litigation of death
penalty cases."). Guideline 9.1 (C)(2) expressly extends this requirement to mitigation specialists
employed in public defender offices, mandating that they "be compensated according to a salary
scale that is commensurate with the salary scale for comparable expert services in the private
sector." ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 9.1(C)(2). Guideline 9.1(C)(3) further
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Supplementary Guideline 9.1 also finds strong support in ABA
Guideline 4.1, which mandates that lawyers obtain services that are
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide high quality legal
representation at every stage of the proceedings" and "ensure provision
of such services to private attorneys whose clients are financially unable
to afford them."" In a capital case in which the background and
character of the accused are a "constitutionally indispensable" element
of the life-or-death decision, 12 competent representation depends upon
counsel's ability to employ a mitigation specialist who has the skills to
obtain the sensitive and personal13 information necessary to present a
reliable and complete life history.
Recognizing that adequate compensation of nonlawyer members of
the team is important to effective performance of the defense function,
Supplementary Guideline 9.1 also warns that "[f]lat fees, caps on
compensation, and lump-sum contracts are improper in death penalty
cases."' 14 ABA Guideline 9. 1(C) uses similar language condemning such
limitations on fees and expenses, and the Supplementary Guidelines
make clear that this concept applies to mitigation specialists and other
nonlawyer members of the defense team. '5 In addition, ABA Guideline
9.1 (C)(3) specifically states that "[p]eriodic billing and payment should
be available" to members of the defense team assisting private counsel.16
The Commentary to ABA Guideline 9.1 discusses further the need for
counsel to be adequately compensated, and gives examples of states like
Texas and Mississippi, where qualified lawyers decline capital
appointments because they simply cannot afford to accept.17
In addressing fees, the ABA Guidelines and Supplementary
Guidelines are simply implementing requirements of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Model Rule 1.5 provides that a lawyer's fee shall
be "reasonable."' 8 The factors listed in the rule are particularly
requires that team members assisting private counsel should be paid at a rate commensurate with
those assisting retained counsel. Id.at Guideline 9.1
(C)(3).
11. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 4.1(B).
12. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003) (quoting a Maryland trial judge
who felt that "not to do a social history, at least to see what you have got, to me is absolute error").
The Supreme Court found trial counsel ineffective for shortcomings that would have been avoided
through the use of a mitigation specialist. Id.at 537-38.
14. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supranote 6, at Guideline 9.1.
15. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 9.1(C); see also SUPPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 9.1.
16. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 9.1(C)(3).
17. Id. at Guideline 9.1, commentary.
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2007).
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instructive in this regard. For example, they identify the time and labor
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill to
perform the legal services properly, whether the engagement will
preclude other engagements by the lawyer, the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services, and the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer performing the services. While issues relating
to reasonable fees typically focus on fees that are too high, in fact, it is
just as important that a fee not be set too low. And when one views the
fee question for capital defense work (both by lawyers and nonlawyers)
in light of these factors, one can see that a reasonable fee to handle
capital defense should be quite generous. Few cases are more time and
labor intensive, require traversing a more difficult jurisprudence,
preclude other employment to a greater extent, or require more
experience, than these representations. Accordingly, setting the fee too
low would mean that securing the services of the lawyers and
nonlawyers required would become virtually impossible, leaving only
those desperate for work-but unqualified to handle it-willing to
accept these engagements. 19
Fee caps have been found to violate the constitutional rights of both
the client and the lawyer.2 0 Indeed, caps on fees and expenses can so
lower the amount that a lawyer or nonlawyer member can hope to
recoup, that the appointment becomes impossible to undertake. 21 This is
especially true in capital cases, where the time commitments and
19. See Eric M. Freedman, Mend It or End It?: The Revised ABA Capital Defense
Representation Guidelines as an Opportunity to Reconsider the Death Penalty, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 663, 669 (2005) (discussing inadequacy of state compensation systems and observing, "[s]ince no
economically rational lawyer would choose to take a death penalty case under these circumstances,
the ones who do are often, like borrowers from a usurer, those with no choice in the matter-and
present the same risk of defaulting on their responsibilities").
20. "An absolute cap on compensable hours or the amount of compensation allowed cannot
co-exist with the indisputable right to effective assistance of counsel, including the right of that
counsel to receive 'adequate funding."' Hoffman v. Haddock, 695 So. 2d 682, 685 (Fla. 1997); see
also State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 141 (N.M. 2007) ("The inadequacy of compensation in this case
makes it unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance."); cf Martinez-Macias v.
Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming grant of petition for habeas corpus because
petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, and noting, "[t]he state paid defense counsel
$11.84 per hour. Unfortunately, the justice system got only what it paid for."). Frederico MartinezMacias was released from prison after establishing his innocence of the crime for which he was
sentenced to death. Bob Herbert, A State Where Justice Is a Joke, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, June
25, 1999, at At5.
21. See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 910 (Mass.
2004) ("The inadequacy of compensation for private attorneys who represent indigent criminal
defendants has persisted for many years. The continuation of what is now an unconstitutional state
of affairs cannot be tolerated."); see also Coulter v. State, 804 S.W.2d 348, 359 (Ark. 1991) (Holt,
C.J., concurring).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6

6

Fox: Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Respo
2008]

CAPITAL GUIDELINES AND ETHICAL DUTIES

expenses are very large and can be unduly oppressive, making statutory
caps inappropriate. 2 "[Ilt is indisputable that the prosecution and
defense of capital murder cases are substantially more expensive than in
non-capital cases., 23 Fee caps, especially in large and complicated cases,
may create a conflict of interest, where the lawyer may be forced to
choose between working on a case and paying his overhead.24 Caps can
lead to lawyers operating "'volume practices,' under which they have a
monetary incentive to dispose of cases as quickly as possible in order to
get to the next case and the next fee." 25 Compensation, therefore, in
capital cases should be based not upon arbitrary maxima, but rather upon
"the experience and ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to
perform the legal service properly, [and] the novelty and difficulty of the

22. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 1986) ("It has long been
the trial courts, most intimately aware of the complexity of the case and the effectiveness of
counsel, which have time after time found the [statutory fee cap] unconstitutional in order to exceed
its guidelines and award a fee more nearly approaching fairness.").
23. Young, 172 P.3d at 141-42; see Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them
Systemically: Governments' Responsibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Defense
Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1097, 1097-98 (2003) ("The death penalty is
expensive.... [A] state's decision to have a criminal justice system in which death is available as a
sanction necessarily entails substantially higher costs than the contrary decision does."); see also
United States v. Taveras, No. 04-156, 2008 WL 565495, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2008) (noting
millions of dollars in costs entailed by "the insistence of the government on a death sentence" in a
case where the defendant was willing to plead to a sentence that would keep him in prison for life).
24. Recently, funding restrictions prompted a court to grant habeas corpus relief to a capital
prisoner because trial counsel "was forced to choose between what was best for his client and what
was best for his family-a conflict of interest in the classic sense." Harlow v. Murphy, No. 05-CV039-B, slip op. at 32 (D. Wyo. filed Feb. 15, 2008); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956); Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 2000) ("A compensation system that results
in substantial losses to the appointed attorney or his firm simply cannot be deemed adequate.");
Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849, 854 (D. Md. 1996) (finding that overhead incurred in
representing a capital defendant to be $53/hour, $18/hour more than the $35/hour payment. An
attorney lost even more per hour, however, if he worked more than allowed by the statutory
maximum); Thomas F. Liotti, Does Gideon Still Make a Difference?, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 105, 13435 (1998) ("The defendant will not receive a fair trial when his counsel's decisions are affected by
obligations to persons other than the defendant."); Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse
Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 603, 662 (1998) ("For lawyers who rely on
paying clients for income, compensation caps often create conflicts of interest. Once the permitted
number of compensable hours is expended, counsel has no financial incentive to devote additional
time to representing an indigent client.").
25. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense. Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 688 (2007); see also Albert L. Vreeland,
II, Note, The Breath of Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 626, 628 (1991) ("[F]ee limitations deprive
indigent defendants of their right to effective assistance of counsel.").
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issues involved., 26 Statutory maxima are grossly unfair, and are not
imposed upon the prosecution, or indeed other necessary participants in
capital trials.27 Courts should also recognize that "'[t]he demands of
handling a death penalty case frequently preclude acceptance of other
employment ' '' 28 not only for the lawyer, but for nonlawyer members of
the defense team as well.
In rejecting fee caps as unreasonable under these circumstances, the
ABA Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines are doing no more than
echoing professional responsibility concerns that have been raised time
and again in a far more mundane context. Insurance companies that hire
counsel for their insureds have regularly tried to limit the cost of defense
they have contractually agreed to provide to their insureds by using
various methods, including fee caps and captive law firms-firms that
purport to be independent, but in fact are simply lawyers employed full
time by the insurance industry. This use of fee caps and the use of
captive law firms have both been condemned in many jurisdictions as
creating a conflict of interest for the lawyer so retained, with the result
that these practices violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.29
For sure, if these practices are found wanting in that context, they are
even more in violation of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct when
the client's life is on the line.
It is highly appropriate that the ABA Guidelines and the
Supplementary Guidelines specifically address the adequacy of the
compensation for mitigation specialists. The focus of the Rules and the
ABA Guidelines, after all, "is the defendant's right to effective
30
representation rather than the attorney's right to fair compensation.
Nonlawyer team members, like lawyers, incur overhead and must
expend significant resources for travel and expenses involved in the

26. Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ark. 1991); see ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7,
at Guideline 9.1, commentary; see also State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 841 (Kan.
1987) ("It is [attorneys'] learned and reflective thought, their recommendations, suggestions,
directions, plans, diagnoses, and advice that is of value to the persons they serve.").
27. Young, 172 P.3d at 140-41 ("Defense counsel may be the only participants in the trial who
are not paid at an hourly rate. The videographer, who merely records witness interviews, receives
$75.00 per hour, and has received at least three to four times the amount that the attorneys have
been compensated.") (footnote and internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 142.
29. See In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 977 (1996).
30. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986); see ABA GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, at Guideline 9.1, commentary (noting that it is clients "and the justice system-rather
than the lawyers (who can always move to more lucrative fields) that are victimized" when
inadequate compensation leaves "capital defense representation to inexperienced or outright
incompetent counsel").
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investigation and preparation of a capital case. 31 This is especially true
of the mitigation specialist, who will frequently need to travel to distant
locations for lengthy periods of time to interview friends, family
members, and other potential witnesses. 32 Because mitigation specialists
typically earn a lower hourly rate than counsel, and incur extensive outof-pocket travel expenses, they cannot survive without timely interim
billing and payment of fees and expenses. As the ABA Guidelines very
appropriately recognize:
[A]ny compensation system that fails to reflect the extraordinary
responsibilities and commitment required of all members of the
defense team in death penalty cases, that does not provide for extra
payments when unusually burdensome representation is provided, or
that does not provide for the periodic payment of fees to all members
the high quality legal
of the defense team will not succeed in obtaining
33
representation required by these Guidelines.
B. Limiting the Defense Team's Workload
In the area of competence, the ABA Guidelines and the
Supplementary Guidelines properly focus attention on the important
question of workload. Model Rule 1.3 ("Diligence") goes right to its
act with reasonable diligence and
important point: "A lawyer shall 34
client."
a
representing
in
promptness
Significantly, the ABA Guidelines expressly differentiate between
the concept of workload and caseload, explaining that workload is
"caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity, support services,
and an attorney's non-representational duties. 35 Lawyers defending
capital cases must have a more limited caseload than those defending

31. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 428 (La. 1993) (awarding expenses past the statutory
maximum and noting that "according to testimony at the district court, as the practice of criminal
law has become more specialized and technical, the funds required for investigation, experts, and
scientific tests have increased considerably").
32. See Gregory J. Kuykendall, Alicia Amezcua-Rodriguez & Mark Warren, Mitigation
Abroad: Preparinga Successful Casefor Life for the ForeignNational Client, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
989(2008).
33. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 7, at Guideline 9.1, commentary (footnote omitted).
34.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).

35. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 7, at Guideline 6.1, commentary.
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noncapital ones,36 because capital defense "requires vastly more time
and effort by counsel than noncapital matters. 3 7
A sleep-deprived member of a capital defense team, no matter how
talented and dedicated, cannot provide competent representation if his or
her workload does not provide the time necessary to handle these
extraordinarily taxing engagements. The most brilliant lawyer or
mitigation specialist in the world, no matter how energetic, can only
address a very small number of capital cases simultaneously to meet the
standards of the ABA Guidelines, and Model Rule 1.1 as well.38 The
teaching of ABA Guideline 10.3 (Obligations of Counsel Respecting
Workload) certainly is an attempt to capture that part of the diligence
requirement that does not reflect the individual lawyer's intelligence,
motivation, or commitment, but rather the obligation to avoid balancing
too many responsibilities.39 Capital cases are intense emotionally and
demanding of one's time. 40 The best of intentions cannot overcome an
excessive workload. Any given case could easily require more than two
full-time lawyers, demanding the retention of additional personnel.
Adding to these lawyers' workload the responsibility for multiple cases
can guarantee a violation of ABA Guideline 10.3 and Model Rule 1.3.
Excessive workload, a 2004 Spangenberg Group report found, causes
36. See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 2000:
REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 3 (2000) ("[L]awyers often have unmanageable

caseloads (700 or more in a year).").
37. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 6.1, commentary ("For example, one study
found that over the entire course of a case, defense attorneys in federal capital cases bill for over
twelve times as many hours as in noncapital homicide cases.").
38. In recognition of these realities, the Guidelines unequivocally mandate that, regardless of
the mechanism through which capital defense services are delivered, both the design of the system
at the structural level and its implementation at the level of the individual lawyer be such as to
ensure that workloads are kept to a level that insures that the capital client receives high quality
legal representation. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 6.1 (describing obligations
at Guideline 10.3 (describing "Obligations of Counsel With Respect
of "Responsible Agency"); id.
to Workload").
39. See Freedman, supra note 23, at 1102 ("Even a skilled lawyer making best efforts to
defend her client competently is probably engaged in a foredoomed project if she is not part of a
system that provides her with the back-up necessary to perform effectively.").
40. See Comm. on Civ. Rts., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Legislative Modification of
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REc. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 848, 854
(1989).
[Undertaking capital representation] means making a commitment to the full legal
and factual evaluation of two very different proceedings (guilt and sentencing) in
circumstances where the client is likely to be the subject of intense public hostility,
where the state has devoted maximum resources to the prosecution, and where one
must endure the draining emotional effects of one's personal responsibility for the
outcome.
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"even the most well-intentioned advocates [to be] overwhelmed,
jeopardizing their clients' constitutional right to effective counsel. '4 1
This is a serious ethical issue. 42 Model Rule 1.1 imposes a duty of
competence, and Model Rule 1.3 establishes that the lawyer owes the
client a duty of diligence.4 3 Both duties are jeopardized by heavy
workloads. The commentary to Model Rule 1.3 specifically requires that
a lawyer limit his workload in order to ensure that he is diligent." Model
Rule 5.1 further requires that a supervisor take reasonable measures to
ensure that all lawyer-employees operate within the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.45 Where a supervisor issues an order that results
in the lawyer's violation of the Model Rules, ratifies such conduct, or
fails to take action to mitigate, the supervisor is held accountable for the
violation.4 6
In 2006, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility ("Ethics Committee"), in response to a request from the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense
("SCLAID") and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
("NLADA"), issued a formal opinion examining the issue of lawyer
workload in the context of whether burdensome public defender
caseloads comply with these Professional Rules. 47 The opinion, 06-441,
addressed "the ethical responsibilities of lawyers, whether employed in
the capacity of public defenders or otherwise, who represent indigent
persons charged with criminal offenses, when the lawyers' workloads
prevent them from providing competent and diligent representation to all
their clients. 4 8 It is the first time that the Ethics Committee has ever
"dealt with the pervasive national problem of excessive caseloads of
public defenders and other lawyers who represent the indigent accused
41.

BUREAU

OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KEEPING

DEFENDER

WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 2 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/185632.pdf
(prepared by The Spangenberg Group for the Bureau of Justice Association).
42. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manisfestofor Public Defenders, 39 VAL.
U. L. REV. 911, 914, 920 (2005) (noting the "depressing but undeniable reality" that public
defenders' workloads force them to "[ration] their resources among clients" and concluding that
ethical standards forbid defense counsel from "carry[ing] a workload that interferes with [a]
minimum standard of competence").
43.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).

44. Id. at R. 1.3, cmt. 2 (2007) (nothing that the attorney's workload "must be controlled so
that each matter can be handled competently").
45. Id. atR. 5.1(b)(2007).
46. Id. at R. 5.1(c) (2007).
47. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (discussing
ethical obligations of lawyers who represent indigent defendants when excessive caseloads interfere
with competent representation).
48. Id. at 1-2.
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in criminal proceedings., 49 The Ethics Committee noted that the issue of
burdensome caseloads of criminal defense counsel differed from that of
civil legal aid lawyers, "who normally are neither court appointed nor
under contracts sometimes requiring them to represent large numbers of
clients." 50
The ethics opinion expressly interprets Model Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3,
and 1.4 as requiring lawyers to "control workload so each matter can be
handled competently," 5' and places responsibility upon both the defense
lawyer and, if at a public defender's office, his supervisor. The Ethics
Committee wrote that "[i]f a lawyer believes that her workload is such
that she is unable to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in
the representation of a client, she must not continue the representation of
that client or, if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the
representation., 52 The Ethics Committee suggests three ways in which a
lawyer in a public defender's office may seek to reduce workload: the
lawyer can transfer "non-representational responsibilities within the
office," refuse new cases, or transfer cases to another lawyer.53 The
opinion directs the lawyer first to approach her supervisor and then, if
the supervisor does not take action, file a motion with the court. 54 The
option that the lawyer chooses "will depend on the environment in
which that lawyer works, keeping
in mind that a lawyer's primary
55
obligation is to existing clients."
In addition, the ethics opinion makes supervisors accountable for
workload problems. In a public defender's office, it is the duty of the
supervisor to "monitor the workloads of subordinate lawyers to ensure
that the workload of each lawyer is appropriate."5 6 The Ethics
Committee suggests four mechanisms through which the supervisor may
accomplish this mandate. 5 7 In addition to transferring cases or nonrepresentational responsibility to other subordinate lawyers, the
supervisor may support the lawyer's motion to withdraw in front of a
49. Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads: The
ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, CHAMPION, Dec. 2006, at 10.
50. Id.
at 11.
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 3 (2006).
52. Id at 4.
53. Id at 5.
54. Id.at 5-6.
55. Oregon State Bar, Formal Op. 2007-178 (2007). The Oregon opinion largely mirrors ABA
Formal Op. 06-441, however, it notes that ABA Formal Op. 06-441 does not address the ethical
obligation of attorneys "involved in the process of contracting for the provision of public defender
services."
56. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 7 (2006).
57. Id.
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court. If the court does not permit the withdrawal, it is the supervisor's
responsibility to provide the lawyer with the necessary resources "to
represent the client(s) in a manner consistent with the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 5 8 "If a supervisor knows that a subordinate's
workload renders the lawyer unable to provide competent and diligent
representation and the supervisor fails to take reasonable remedial
action, under [Model] Rule 5.1 (c), the supervisor himself is responsible
for the subordinate's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."59
The opinion notes the issue of scarcity of resources, but determines that
"[i]n the final analysis, however,
each client is entitled to competent and
60
diligent representation."
The Ethics Committee's opinion concludes that "[a]ll lawyers,
including public defenders, have an ethical obligation to control their
workloads so that every matter they undertake will be handled
competently and diligently.",61 The opinion "is enormously important
because it furnishes potent ammunition for defenders seeking relief from
excessive caseloads before judges and from those in charge of their
offices. 62 It seeks to address and alleviate a major systemwide
problem-the unreasonable workloads of those who seek to provide
indigent defense. State courts and state ethics committees have in the
past attempted to address this serious concern.63 However, "none of the
58. Id. The opinion cites to several state cases for support in holding supervisors accountable
under Model Rule 5.1(c). See, e.g., id at 4 n. 12 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ficker, 706
A.2d 1045, 1051-52 (Md. 1998)); id. at 6 n.21 (citing Mich. Bar Comm. on Prof'l & Jud. Ethics Op.
RI-252 (1996)).
59. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c) (2007).
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 8 (2006); see
also Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062, 1070-71 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding a lack of funding and
possibility of mismanagement by the public defender not an acceptable excuse for backlog and
delay of two plus years for filing of direct appeals).
61. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 9 (2006).
62. Lefstein & Vagenas, supra note 49, at 11. But see Jessica Haflkin, A Lawyer's Ethical
Obligation to Refuse New Cases or to Withdraw from Existing Ones when Faced with Excessive
Caseloads that Prevent Him from Providing Competent and Diligent Representation to Indigent
Defendants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 657, 663-67 (2007) (questioning the practical application of
transferring cases from overloaded public defenders because it assumes that there are public
defenders who are not overloaded, and calling for systemic change).
63. Several courts have also attempted in the past to deal with this problem. See Miranda v.
Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 469-71 (9th Cir. 2003) (For the purposes of a civil § 1983 action, the
head of the public defender system may be held liable for implementing policies which failed to
provide adequate resources to defendants, thus depriving them of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This case involves the Clark County, Nevada, public defender system, which apparently had
policies of administering polygraph tests and then allotting minimal resources to defendants who
failed and assigning to capital cases attorneys with the least experience and no capital defense
training.); Harris,938 F.2d at 1070-71 (holding a backlog and two-plus year delay for direct appeal
presumptively unreasonable and may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Smith,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:775

state bar ethics opinions are as comprehensive as the ABA's opinion and
none of the other opinions were rendered by an ethics body of
comparable prestige that speaks on behalf of the largest group of lawyers
in America. '" 64 "The relentless pressure on public defenders is not likely
to let up. [And disciplinary authorities are not] likely to give [Public
Defenders] a pass on the obligation to provide competent, diligent
representation to clients. 65 Nor should they.
Workload issues, however, confront not only lawyers, regardless of
the settings in which they practice,66 but all members of the defense
team. Accordingly, the Supplementary Guidelines stress counsel's duty
to "ensure that the workload of defense team members in death penalty
cases is maintained at a level that enables counsel to provide each client
with high quality legal representation., 67 Supplementary Guideline 6.1
further requires public defender offices that maintain mitigation
specialists on staff to "implement mechanisms to ensure that their
workload is maintained at a level that enables them to provide each
client with high quality services., 68 Supplementary Guideline 10.3 states
the corollary that each and every team member limit his or her workload
in order "to provide each client with high quality legal representation"
that comports with the Supplementary Guidelines and the ABA
Guidelines.6 9
Just as lawyers' workloads must be kept at reasonable levels to
ensure competent representation, so too must capital defense counsel70
monitor the workloads of the nonlawyer members of the defense team

No. 04PDJ108, 2006 WL 1681794, at *1 (Colo. O.P.D.J. June 6, 2006) (approving three year
suspension from practice of law for sole practitioner who "admittedly carried an excessive caseload.
As a result, he neglected several client matters and knowingly failed to communicate with a number
of his clients."); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 790 (La. 1993) ("[B]ecause of the excessive
caseloads and the insufficient support with which their attorneys must work, indigent defendants in
Section E are generally not provided with the effective assistance of counsel the constitution
requires.").
64. Lefstein & Vagenas, supra note 49, at 16. For a discussion of various state systems
implemented to deal with excessive caseloads prior to ABA Formal Op. 06-441, see Scott Wallace
& David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV.
245, 253-58 (2004).
65. Eileen Libby, Keep Up the Good Work: Ethics Rules on Competent Representation Make
No Exception for Public Defenders, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 24, 24.
66. See supra note 38.
67. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 6.1.
68. Id.
69. Id. at Guideline 10.3.
70. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 6. 1. As indicated, Guideline 6.1 calls for the
Responsible Agency to limit the attorney's workload. See supra note 38. Guideline 10.3 imposes
that duty on the attorney himself. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.3.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6

14

Fox: Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Respo
2008]

CAPITAL GUIDELINES AND ETHICAL DUTIES

so that the client will receive, in fact, the benefits of their work as
contemplated by ABA Guideline 4.1. As one mitigation specialist has
observed: "An uncommonly gifted individual with expertise ranging
from DNA to the DSM cannot diligently pursue the two investigative
tracks that are part of every capital case ....

If one individual is

assigned to make that attempt, then lead counsel has violated the duty
imposed by ABA Guideline 10.4 to assemble a defense team that
provides the client with high quality legal representation.
C. The Scope of Representation
Model Rule 1.2(c) provides that "[a] lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances
and the client gives informed consent., 72 The comment to the rule
admonishes the lawyer that "[a]lthough this Rule affords the lawyer and
client substantial latitude,... the limitation must be reasonable under

the circumstances., 73 Handling a capital case provides a new dimension
in answering the question of limitations. In a capital case, the nature and
complexity of the issues, the sheer magnitude of the work required for
competent performance, and the need-strongly emphasized by ABA
Guideline 10.10.1 and its Commentary, and reinforced by
Supplementary Guideline 10. 11(A)-to present "a coherent, harmonious
theme that span[s] both the guilt and penalty, 74 issues, all weigh heavily
against the validity of any limitations on the scope of the
representation.75 Quite simply, because of all that is at stake, no scope
limitation could be viewed as reasonable here. And a review of the
excellent ABA Guidelines is a testimonial to that point.
Once the team is established, the broadest planning and
investigation must take place. Only with a comprehensive planning
effort will the categories of areas of investigation be fully identified and
only with a complete investigation can counsel be prepared for
71. Russell Stetler, Capital Cases: Mitigation Investigation: A Duty That Demands Expert
Help But Can'tBe Delegated,CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 61, 62.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007).

73. Id. at R. 1.2(c), cmt. (2007).
74. Melissa E. Whitman, Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life Versus Death
Decisions Are Made, What Persuades,and How to Most Effectively Communicate the Needfor a
Verdict of Life, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 263, 280 (1999).

75. Of course, it is perfectly appropriate for a fully staffed defense team to assign any given
member of the team to specific issues of law or fact, such as jury selection, complex mental health
or scientific evidence, or other specialized matters, just so there is no scope limitation on the
responsibilities of the team itself. See SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline
10.4(B).
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negotiation or trial. But this is only the beginning. Counsel must seize
those opportunities that arise over the many years of the post-conviction
course of typical capital cases to negotiate a plea, persuade the
prosecutor to abandon the death sentence, or gather those facts that will
eliminate the threat of capital punishment because the crime can be
shown to be not death eligible or indeed because76 yet another look at the
evidence shows the client to be simply innocent.
The ABA Guidelines provide a useful catalogue of areas of inquiry.
They suggest broad categories-medical history, family and social
history, educational history, military service, employment and training
history, and prior bouts with the law-and provide extensive examples
of what is included in their ambit. The Supplementary Guidelines
describe in additional useful detail the existing obligations and methods
of competent capital representation.77
From the beginning, both the guilt-innocence and the penalty
phases must be the equally important double focus of the defense. As to
the former, investigation must be made of all evidence regarding the
crime-testimonial, forensic, whatever-regardless of any admission of
guilt or how overwhelming the likelihood of guilt might be.78 The fact
that inadequate investigations-failing to uncover flawed eyewitness
testimony, false confessions, mendacious jailhouse informants and
unreliable forensic evidence-have contributed to so many wrongful
convictions 79 only heightens the importance of an expanded scope of
service for the ethical lawyer at all stages of the representation, who
must throughout the proceedings deploy intense skepticism as to all
aspects of the state's case. 80 The ABA Guidelines remind the
conscientious lawyer to repeatedly investigate potential witnesses on
various matters-facts, abilities and disabilities, life history, to secure all

76. See Eric M. Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines and the Duties of Lawyers and
Judges in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 335-36 (2003)
(citing relevant Guidelines and Commentary).
77. See Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the
MitigationFunction of Capital Defense Teams, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693,710-11 (2008).
78. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 7, at Guideline 10.7(A).
79.

See WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN

CAPITAL CASES 37-42 (2006); see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerationsin the United States,
1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 523 (2005).
80. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.7, commentary (drawing on this
experience to "underscore[] the importance of defense counsel's duty to take seriously the
possibility of the client's innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality of the state's case, and to
investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses," notwithstanding that the "circumstances appear
overwhelmingly indicative of guilt") (footnote omitted).
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information available from the prosecution and police files, 81 to examine
physical evidence, to visit the scene, and to be ever mindful of the
changes in the relevant environment. 8 2The law changes; peoples'
perspectives change; technology changes.
These ongoing responsibilities of the lawyer may not be limited by
the client. 83 This is because the client cannot make an informed decision
as to how to proceed until the client knows what is possible, and it is the
lawyer's ethical duty
to present the full smorgasbord, even to an
84
uninterested client.
Thus a complete investigation must be followed by comprehensive
preparation for trial, while simultaneously preserving any possibility of a
plea discussion. The scope of counsel's responsibilities at trial are
similarly broad, preparing for the direct examination of defense
witnesses and for the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses,
preparing exhibits and challenging any of the prosecution, preparing for
jury selection with all the intelligence about the particular venue one can
muster, and intense preparation of approaches likely to overcome the
inherent bias of being forced to face a death-qualified jury. Likewise,
counsel representing the client in appellate, post-conviction, or clemency
proceedings must also utilize the diligent team approach in exploring
facts and issues that may have been unavailable to the sentencer because
of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, 85 because of the refusal to adequately
fund prior representation at trial, appeal or in previous post-conviction

81. See Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711-12 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting writ where trial
counsel's performance at guilt phase was ineffective in lacking "an adequate investigation of the
facts of the case, consideration of viable theories, and development of evidence to support those
theories," and state post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to perform full analysis of
"trial testimony and the police record [and failing to conduct] interviews with the persons who
testified at trial or had firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the murder").
82. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.9.1, commentary.
As in other sorts of protracted litigation, circumstances change over time (e.g., through
replacement of a prosecutor, death of a prosecution witness, alteration in viewpoint of a
key family member of the client or the victim, favorable developments in the law or the
litigation, reconsideration by the client) and as they do new possibilities arise. Whenever
they do, counsel must pursue them.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. See id. at Guideline 10.7, commentary.
84. In Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), counsel faced the protypical uninterested
client. When counsel attempted to discuss a mitigation strategy, "Rompilla told them he was 'bored
being here listening' and returned to his cell." Id. at 381. Counsel were nevertheless found
ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into Rompilla's mitigation case. Id. at
383.
85. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000).
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proceedings,86 because of the failure of the prosecution to disclose
exculpatory information material to punishment or guilt, 87 or because,
for whatever reason, the proceedings so far-however 88lengthy they may
have been-have simply failed to produce a just result.
At no stage of a capital representation may counsel limit the scope
of the services to be provided without risking violation of Model Rule
1.2.89
III.

THE DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT

Central to the ethical provision of legal services in any setting is the
lawyer's duty to exercise independent judgment on the client's behalf.
The duty of loyalty and the duty to use independent judgment are two
sides of the same coin, and go much deeper than simply avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests.
A.

The Duty to Use Independent ProfessionalJudgment on Behalf of
the Client

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct insist on lawyer
independence, and prohibit counsel from accepting legal employment if
"a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.' 90 Indeed, in a criminal case, this duty is an essential
component of the constitutional right to counsel. "Government violates
86. See, e.g., Harlow v. Murphy, No. 05-CV-039-B, slip op. at 30-32 (D. Wyo. filed Feb. 15,
2008) (insufficient funding prevented counsel from conducting important witness interviews); see
also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 442 (2000) (finding that the prisoner's claims were not
barred from federal habeas review where state post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully asked the
state courts for funds to employ an expert and an investigator to investigate suspected jury
misconduct claims).
87. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963) (the State failed to disclose
mitigating evidence in the government's possession); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 428-29
(1995) (the State failed to disclose impeachment evidence material to the issue of guilt or
innocence).
88. State ex reL. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548-49 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
89. Moreover, as the Guidelines and Commentary appropriately note, this stricture is not
limited by the contours of the capital litigation itself. There are many situations throughout the
course of a typical capital representation in which the lawyer's ethical duty may require the pursuit
of collateral litigation or administrative advocacy. For a representative collection of such instances,
see ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 1.1, commentary and Guideline 10.8,
commentary. To take just one example, counsel's duty to pursue a method-of-execution challenge is
in no way lessened because it is properly asserted as an action under Section 1983 rather than as a
claim in a habeas corpus petition. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579, 584 (2006); Nelson v.
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004).
90.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d)(3) (2007).
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the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with
the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to
conduct the defense." 9'
Both the ABA Guidelines and the Supplementary Guidelines
implement this mandate. The multidisciplinary team is designed to
support, not supplant, counsel's duty to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of the client. The ABA Guidelines are
based on the recognition that although "the mitigation function is multifaceted and multi-disciplinary, . . . the ultimate responsibility for the
investigation of such issues rests irrevocably with counsel. 9 2 Hence, the
Introduction to the Supplementary Guidelines declares: "The duty to
investigate, develop and pursue avenues relevant to mitigation of the
offense or penalty, and to effectively communicate the fruits of those
efforts to the decision-makers, rests upon defense counsel. 9 3 The
Supplementary Guidelines further provide that the nonlawyer defense
team members-investigators, mitigation specialists, and members of
counsel's staff-are "agents of defense counsel. 94
These provisions reflect the "prevailing professional norms
for... capital defense teams. 95 Further, the directions of the
Supplementary Guidelines assure that a nonlawyer who assists a lawyer
in the delivery of legal services will act in a manner consistent with the
lawyer's professional obligations.96
B. The ContinuingDuty ofLoyalty to the Client
In 2003, this author wrote about the trial lawyer's natural tendency
to be influenced by considerations antagonistic to the interests of his
client. No one wants to be accused of being ineffective, and trial lawyers
may feel that the adverse result of the trial was due in large part to
decisions made by the client, such as declining a reasonable plea offer or
failing to cooperate in the investigation. 97 In spite of this potential
antipathy, the ethical obligations of trial counsel-embodied in ABA
Guideline 10.13 (The Duty to Facilitate the Work of Successor
91.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).

92.

SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Introduction; see also ABA GUIDELINES,

supra note 7, at Guideline 10.4(B) ("Lead counsel bears overall responsibility for the performance
of the defense team.").
93. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Introduction.
94. Id. at Guideline 4.1(C).
95. Id. at Guideline 1.1.
96. Id. at Guideline 4.1(C).
97. Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful. Predecessor Counsel's Ethical
Duty to the CapitalDefendant, 31 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1181, 1185-86 (2003).
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Counsel)-require them to "put those feelings aside to determine how
they can help with the habeas proceedings." 98 This obligation derives
from multiple sources, including the continued duty to maintain
confidentiality, 99 the continued duty to "protect the client's interest to the
extent reasonably practicable,"'' °° the duty to facilitate successor
counsel's work by turning over a "complete" and "well-organized"
file, 1 1 and the lawyer's fiduciary duty to "put the client's interests ahead
of his or her own and inform the client of [any] failing."'' 0 2 "[I]n order to
give real meaning to [Model] Rule 1.16's injunction to protect the client
upon withdrawal," a lawyer whose former client 0faces
the ultimate
3
sanction must cooperate fully with successor counsel.1
To what extent are the obligations to assist appellate and postconviction counsel shared by the nonlawyer members of the defense
team? The Supplementary Guidelines provide appropriate guidance on
these issues:
All members of the defense team are agents of defense counsel.
They are bound by rules of professional responsibility that govern the
conduct of counsel respecting privilege, diligence, and loyalty to the
client. The privileges and protections applicable to the work of all
defense team members derive from their role as agents of defense
counsel. The confidentiality of communication with persons providing
services pursuant to court appointment should be protected to the same
extent as if such persons were privately retained. Like counsel, nonattorney members of the defense team have a duty to maintain
complete and accurate files, including records that may assist
98. Id.at 1186; see also ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.13.
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. (2007) ("The duty of confidentiality
continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."). While an allegation of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel may result in an implied waiver of the attorney-client or work-product
privileges, such a waiver permits former counsel "to testify in response to proper questions and no
more." Fox, supra note 97, at 1187. The waiver does not permit trial counsel to meet with the
prosecutor, and trial counsel must provide successor counsel with an opportunity to "raise all
appropriate objections, including those addressing the scope of the waiver." Id.Rules 1.6 and 3.4
make it clear that it is impermissible for the prosecution to "seek privileged or confidential
information from the former counsel." Id.at 1188 (citing Ackerman v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts, 887 F.
Supp. 510, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992),
amended and reconsidered on other grounds, 144 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. La. 1992); Rentclub, Inc. v.
Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992); MMR/Wallace
Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 724-28 (D. Conn. 1991)).
100. Fox, supra note 97, at 1189 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (1999)).
101. Id. at 1190. Indeed, counsel have been disciplined for failing to provide client files to
successor counsel. In re Cooper, 729 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Wis. 2007).
102. Fox, supra note 97, at 1191 (citing Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand,
491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971); McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)).
103. Id.at 1192-93.
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in documenting attempts to comply with these
successor counsel
04
Guidelines.1

Because the Constitution places the obligation to conduct a
reasonable investigation and to make reasonable strategic decisions
squarely on the shoulders of defense counsel,' °5 nonlawyer members of
the defense team must abide by counsel's decisions. In the course of
defending a capital case, situations may arise in which highly trained
nonlawyer members of the team disagree with the judgment of counsel,
or feel that counsel is not approaching the case with the appropriate level
of diligence. The Supplementary Guidelines contain two provisions
which appropriately address such a situation. First, they acknowledge
members
and
team
with
on
consultation
that
"based
[c]ounsel decides how mitigation evidence will be
experts,... 106
presented."'
Second, and equally important, the Supplementary Guidelines
provide that "non-attorney members of the defense team have a duty to
maintain complete and accurate files, including records that may assist
in documenting attempts to comply with these
successor counsel
10 7
Guidelines."'
The mitigation specialist's file can be an important source of
information for post-conviction counsel, and can protect the client from
counsel's lapses in performance. For example, in a recent decision
granting habeas corpus relief, the district court relied on a memo from
the mitigation specialist "less than two months after the offense,
identifying a number of witnesses in Nebraska who needed to be
interviewed as part of the investigation.' 08 The mitigation specialist's
paper trail of attempts to obtain funding to conduct necessary mitigation
investigation was important to the district court's conclusion that
defense counsel was on notice of "powerful mitigation evidence," which

104. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guidelines 4.1(C) (emphasis added).
105. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984). The Supplementary Guidelines
reflect this recognition of counsel's role:
Counsel bears ultimate responsibility for the performance of the defense team and
for decisions affecting the client and the case. It is the duty of counsel to lead the team in
conducting an exhaustive investigation into the life history of the client. It is therefore
incumbent upon the defense to interview all relevant persons and obtain all relevant
records and documents that enable the defense to develop and implement an effective
defense strategy.
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 10.4(A).

106. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 10.4(B).
107. Id. at Guideline 4.1(C).
108. Harlow v. Murphy, No. 05-CV-039-B, slip op. at 40 (D. Wyo. filed Feb. 15, 2008).
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"would have tipped the scales for one or more jurors on the issue of
punishment."' 0 9 Thus, the Supplementary Guidelines provide a blueprint
for a working relationship among the defense team that both preserves
"the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings,""110 and
protects the client's right to a remedy from counsel's deficient
performance.
IV.

THE DUTY TO COMMUNICATE CONFIDENTIALLY WITH THE CLIENT

As former Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Judge William
Bowen points out: "It is unreasonable to expect anyone in [a capital
defendant's] stressful circumstances to trust an attorney he had just
met.""' A primary function of the mitigation specialist is to facilitate
communication between the client and the lawyer. The law protects and
facilitates communications between the client and agents of the lawyer
who are necessary to the lawyer's representation, such as file clerks,
secretaries, or paralegal assistants."l 2 This protection includes "those
agents whose services are required by the lawyer in order that he or she
may properly prepare his or her client's case."' 3 Clearly, investigators
and mitigation specialists qualify as such agents. 14 Thus, to the extent
they assist counsel in his duty to communicate with the client, they are
also bound by counsel's duty to maintain the confidences and privileges
of the client, as discussed below.
A.

The Duty to Communicate with the Client

The fundamental duty imposed by Model Rule 1.4, like Model Rule
1.1, reflects the fiduciary duty that lawyers owe their clients to
communicate with them in multiple respects. First, the lawyer must
inform the client fully as to any matter as to which the client must give
informed consent. Second, the lawyer must consult with the client as to
the means to be used in order to accomplish the client's objectives.
Third, the client must be kept reasonably informed about the status of
109. Id. at 41,44.
110. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
111. William M. Bowen, Jr., A Former Alabama Appellate Judge's Perspective on the
Mitigation Function in Capital Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 813 (2008).

112. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (secretaries, paralegals,
legal assistants, stenographers or clerks are privileged agents); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5482, at 264-65 (1986); 1 JOHN
W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91, at 364-65 (5th ed. 1999).
113. State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421,423 (Md. 1979).
114. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-37 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the matter. Fourth, the lawyer must comply with the client's requests for
information. Fifth, the lawyer must explain to the client the limitations
placed by the rules on what the lawyer may undertake on the client's
behalf. Finally, the lawyer is reminded by Model Rule 1.4 to explain
matters sufficiently so the client can make informed decisions.115
The ABA Guidelines add a wonderful second dimension to this
duty to communicate by emphasizing what every lawyer in every
representation should recognize: Effective communication is not just in
the words but in the relationship between lawyer and client. ABA
Guideline 10.5 starts by admonishing the lawyer to develop a
relationship of trust and requires the maintenance of "close contact with
the client."'1 16 In emphasizing both early and frequent contact, the ABA
Guidelines are reminding lawyers of the important building blocks to
effective communication, reminding lawyers that through the client's
eyes, the idea of trust may not be the first response a new client might
have, that this responsibility cannot be delegated to others and that the
development of rapport takes time and might involve the participation of
others, such as family members, beyond the client himself.1" 7 The ABA
Guidelines also make the point, one reemphasizing the importance of
Model Rule 1.4, that the lawyer who has done a better job of
communicating with the client will18 also be in a better position to
communicate on the client's behalf.
Lawyer-client communication is "the heart of the attorney-client
relationship."1 1 9 Supplementary Guidelines 5.1(C) and 10.11(C)
recognize that effective representation requires the team to build rapport
with the client. Supplementary Guideline 5.1(C), addressing the
qualifications of the defense team, notes that the mitigation specialist's
ability to build rapport is necessary "to overcome barriers... against the
disclosure of sensitive information and to assist the client with the
emotional impact of such disclosures." '120 Supplementary Guideline
10.11(C) requires the team to conduct "in-person, face-to-face, one-onone interviews" and advises that "[m]ultiple interviews will be necessary
to establish trust, elicit sensitive information and conduct a thorough and
115.
116.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 & cmt. (2007).
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.5(A).

117. See id. at Guideline 10.5, commentary; see also Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume
Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History Investigation as the Foundationfor a Reliable Mental
Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 963, 969-70 (2008).
118. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.5, commentary.
119.

John M. Burman, The Duty of Communication Under the New Wyoming Rules, WYO.

LAW., Oct. 2007, at 44, 47.
120. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supranote 6, at Guideline 5.1(C).
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reliable life-history investigation." Supplementary Guideline 10.11(C)
further advises that such rapport is "necessary to provide the client with
guarantees relevant to a
a defense in accordance with' 2constitutional
1
proceeding."'
sentencing
capital
The duty to communicate is "both an ethical and legal duty of the
lawyer."' 122 The ethical duty derives from the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which characterize the duty as one to explain
12
1
things sufficiently so that the client can make informed decisions.
Failure of a lawyer to communicate with his client damages, if not
and may result in sanctions by
destroys, the lawyer-client relationship,
24
state boards and ethics committees. 1
The ethical duty of communication exists in any lawyer-client
relationship. In the context of capital defense the duty is particularly
demanding. ABA Guideline 10.5 (Relationship With the Client) requires
counsel to "establish a relationship of trust with the client,
and.., maintain close contact with the client.' 25 The requirement
expressly extends to all stages of representation and requires counsel to
"engage in a continuing interactive dialogue with the client concerning
all matters that might reasonably be expected to have a material impact
on the case."' 26 Commentary to the ABA Guidelines discusses some of
the challenges posed by capital clients:
Many capital defendants are.., severely impaired in ways that
make effective communication difficult: they may have mental
illnesses or personality disorders that make them highly distrustful or
impair their reasoning and perception of reality; they may be mentally
retarded or have other cognitive impairments that affect their judgment

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at Guideline 10.11(C).
Burman, supra note 119, at 44.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2007).
See, e.g., People v. Duitch, 2007 WL 4731007, at *1-4 (Colo. O.P.D.J. Nov. 27, 2007)

(attorney disbarred for client neglect and conversion of funds); People v. Marsh, 2006 WL 702003,
at * 1 (Colo. O.P.D.J. Mar. 17, 2006) (attorney suspended from the practice of law for conversion of

funds and "fail[ure] to properly communicate with his clients"); People v. Caughron, No.
05PDJ065, 2005 WL 2708267, at *1 (Colo. O.P.D.J. Oct. 12, 2005) (attorney suspended and placed
on probation for violating multiple rules of professional conduct, including the duty to communicate
with clients); Fla. Bar v. Baron, Nos. SC03-490, SC03-1009, 2003 WL 23996016, at *34 (Fla.
Sept. 2003) (attorney disbarred for violating multiple rules of professional conduct, including the
duty to communicate with clients); Fla. Bar v. Walker, 530 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 1988) (attorney

disbarred for conversion of funds, fraud, and "failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter"); In re Harris, 890 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (attorney reprimanded
for failing to keeping client adequately informed).
125. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 7, at Guideline 10.5.
126. Id. at Guideline 10.5(C).
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and understanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal;•,or127they
may be in complete denial in the face of overwhelming evidence.

There are other barriers as well which impede the lawyer-client
relationship in capital and indigent defense. A client's distrust of lawyers
can stem not just from mental illness, but from past experiences with
lawyers and the criminal justice system. In addition, "cultural
differences between lawyers and the indigent clients can impede the
provision of adequate defense services to indigent defendants. ' 28
Under the professional rules, communication between the lawyer
and client is necessary in order for the lawyer to properly advise his
client. Given the difficulties above, communication takes time,
resources, and effort. Gaining the trust of a capital client and building
rapport are crucial to providing the type of assistance and advice
necessary to legal representation, especially when confronting the
sensitive issues that a capital defense team will confront.
The lawyer's heightened obligation to communicate with a capital
client is sometimes difficult to meet. Workload of team members for
example can be a major impediment to communication.1 29 As discussed
above, counsel for indigent defendants frequently grapple with high
workloads and low funding. "When excessive caseloads bombard the
representatives of the indigent... defense attorneys barely have enough
time to introduce themselves."1 30 The Commentary to the ABA
127. Id. at Guideline 10.5, commentary.
128. Timothy H. Everett, Post-Gideon Developments in Law and Lawyering, 4 CONN. PUB.
INT'L L.J. 20, 43 (2004) ("In 1973 Judge Bazelon observed that [because of] cultural differences
between lawyers and indigent clients ... :'"uptown" lawyers often have a serious communication
problem in dealing with an indigent defendant. They are not prepared for the cultural shock of
learning that their client is neither middle class nor cast in their image of the "deserving poor."'")
(quoting David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel,42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (1973)).
129. Patrick Noaker, It Doesn't Come With the Territory: Public Defenders Must Decline to
Violate Legal and Ethical Standards in the Face of Rising Caseloads, 10 CRIM. JUST. 14, 1718 (1995) ("Probably the most immediately obvious and distressing area affected by an unwieldy
caseload is client communication"-discussing In re Stricker, 808 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. 1991) (en
banc) (attorney violated an ethical duty to communicate by being unavailable by phone and clients
contacted the circuit clerk's office to try to reach him); In re Gray, 813 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Mo. 1991)
(en banc) (attorney failed to return a client's telephone calls and to communicate with the client by
telephone or correspondence regarding developments in the client's case constituted a violation of
ethical duties); In re Stewart, 782 S.W.2d 390, 392-93 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) (attorney disbarred for,
among other things, failing to keep clients informed despite repeated requests)).
130. David L. Wilson, Constitutional Law: Making a Case for Preserving the Integrity of
Minnesota's Public Defender System: Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996), 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1117, 1139 (1996); see also S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory
Op. 04-12 (2004). As described by the South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee:
A public defender may not undertake or maintain a caseload that results in the attorney
violating ethical obligations of competence (Rule 1.1), diligence (Rule 1.3), and
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Guidelines recognizes that a "mitigation specialist, social worker or
other mental health expert can help identify and overcome these barriers,
and assist counsel in establishing a rapport with the client."'13' However,
the Commentary makes clear that, consistent with the Model Rules of
Conduct, the ethical duty falls squarely on the shoulders of
Professional
32
counsel.
B.

The Duty to Protect Confidential Client Information-Rule 1.6

The importance of the Model Rule establishing the fiduciary
obligation of confidentiality is very much reflected in ABA Guideline
10.8 (Relationship with the Client), and throughout the Supplementary
Guidelines. This is because the foundation of the development of a
relationship of trust with the client must be a commitment-an oftrepeated commitment-to maintaining the confidences of the client. The
Supreme Court has described "the attorney-client privilege under federal
law, as 'the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law."", 33 The Supplementary Guidelines make the
point that the privilege is of utmost importance in legal proceedings in
which the client's life hangs in the balance.
The very raison d'tre of the confidentiality obligation is the fact
that, as hard as it is to convince clients they should share their innermost
concerns with their lawyers, one way to overcome that reluctance is to
pledge that the lawyers' lips are sealed. The privilege exists "to
encourage full and frank communication between lawyers and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.' 34 In the world of capital litigation,
this commitment becomes even more important because the need for
client trust is higher and the stakes are so profound. The Supplementary
Guidelines appropriately make repeated reference to the duty of the

communication (1.4). In deciding whether the attorney's caseload is resulting in ethical
violations, national caseload standards are a factor to be considered but are not
determinative. Instead, the attorney should decide whether the attorney's caseload is
interfering with basic functions required of lawyers, such as communication ....
Id.
131. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.5, commentary.
132. Id. ("Although,... ongoing communication by non-attorney members of the defense team
is important, it does not discharge the obligation of counsel at every stage of the case to keep the
client informed of developments and progress in the case, and to consult with the client on strategic
and tactical matters.").
133. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
134. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
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entire defense team to maintain the confidentiality of client
communications. 135 Under no circumstances should counsel in a capital
case proceed in a fashion that enables the prosecution to use
members of
136
the defense team as state's witnesses against the accused.
It follows as a matter of the highest ethical imperative not just that
"it is counsel's obligation to insist upon making [requests for needed
resources] ex parte and in camera," 137 but that lawyers have a duty under
the professional rules to go to the limit to defend the confidentiality of
the legal and factual investigative work of the defense team in the event
that a court fails to respect this core principle.1 38 After all, the ultimate
purpose of mandating confidentiality so as to ensure the effective
representation of each
individual client is to benefit the criminal justice
39
system as a whole.1
ABA Guideline 10.5(B)(2) highlights yet another related ethical
obligation of the lawyer, stating: "Promptly upon entry into the case,
initial counsel should communicate in an appropriate manner with both
the client and the government regarding ...preservation of the attorneyclient privilege and similar safeguards."' 140 Actually, the ethical
obligation of the lawyer is broader than that. The lawyer must take all
steps necessary to assure that the attorney-client privilege is maintained.
This means the lawyer must conduct conversations outside the earshot of
those who would destroy the privilege and otherwise communicate in
ways that will be deemed privileged. Further, as the Supplementary
Guidelines state: "Counsel must provide mitigation specialists with
knowledge of the law affecting their work, including...
rules affecting
14 t
confidentiality, disclosure, privileges and protections.'
135. See SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 4.1(C) (all defense team
members "are bound by rules of professional responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel
respecting privilege, diligence, and loyalty to the client"); id. at Guideline 4.1(D) (counsel must
inform non-attomey defense team members of "rules affecting confidentiality, disclosure, privileges
and protections"); id. at Guideline 5.1(C) (mitigation specialists must have the skills to conduct
interviews that produce "confidential,relevant and reliable information") (emphasis added).
136. Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1246-47 (Fla. 1983).
137. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.4, commentary; see SUPPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 4.1
(A).
138. Every first year law student learns about the protection of attorney work product from
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). But that is only because attorney Fortenbaugh, in the
entirely appropriate performance of his ethical duties, went into contempt to vindicate his clients'
rights. Id. at 499-500.
139. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) ("Although the work-product
doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital.").
140. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.5(B)(2).
141.

SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at Guideline 4.1(D).
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Counsel must also organize the defense team in such a way as to
utilize these protections for the maximum benefit of the client. The ABA
Guidelines specifically direct counsel to "structure the [defense] team in
such a way as to distinguish between experts who will play a
'consulting' role, serving as part of the defense team covered by the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and experts who
will be called to testify, thereby waiving such protections.'' 4 2 It is well
established that the investigator in a defense team, as an agent or
representative of counsel, also must maintain confidentiality of all
communications with the client as well as act in a manner that preserves
the work product privilege. 43 The ABA Guidelines thus properly advise
that the mitigation specialist, who is also a member of the defense team,
and thus an agent of counsel, be properly supervised in all his or her
44
endeavors, so as to enjoy the benefit of the work product privilege.
But it is absolutely necessary, in order to preserve these "vital"
privileges and protections, that counsel make the decision whether a
consultant will testify early on, lest he or she be placed in jeopardy of
exposing privileged communications or otherwise non-discoverable
information from or about his client.
V.

CONCLUSION

Nearly twenty years ago, a Maryland court observed that "given the
complexities of modem existence, few if any lawyers could, as a
practical matter, represent the interest of their clients without a variety of
nonlegal assistance.' ' 45 The world has not become any less complex
since those words were written, particularly not with respect to the
litigation of death penalty cases. As the ABA Guidelines and related
142. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.4, commentary; see also Mickell
Branham & Richard Burr, Understanding Defense-Initiated Victim Outreach and Why It Is
Essential in Defending a CapitalClient, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1019, 1026-28 (2008).
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39.
At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney,
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case.
But the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our
adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the
assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation
for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for
the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself.
Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39.
144. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.4; see also United States v. Johnson, 378
F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (social history chronology prepared by the mitigation
specialist was subject to work product privilege).
145. State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421,423 (Md. 1979).
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commentary observed, multidisciplinary defense teams that include
mitigation specialists have become part of the "existing 'standard of
care' in capital cases. 146 Lawyers must take affirmative steps to
preserve the fiduciary obligations of the legal profession, including
competence, independence of professional judgment, protection of
confidential client information, and loyalty to the client. The
Supplementary Guidelines are a welcome resource to help both lawyers
and nonlawyers provide effective and ethical client services in death
penalty cases.

146. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 7, at Guideline 4.1, commentary.
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